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STATE OF NEW YO=
SUPREME COURT

In The Matter of ART€€URMONTGOMERY,
Petitioner,

-against-

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respondent,

For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

- -

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Tam

Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI # 01-13-ST4326 Index No. 6715 -12
Appearances:

Arthur Montgomery
h a t e No. 83-A-6495
Petitioner,Pro Se
Gouverneur CorrectionaI Facility
P.O. Box 480
Gouverneur, N Y 13642-0370

Eric T. Schneideman
Attorney General
State of New York
Attorney For Respondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
(Brian J. O'Donnell,
Assistant Attorney General
of Counsel)
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice

The petitioner, an inmate at Gouverneur Correctional Facility, has commenced the
instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated October
11, 201 1 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. The petitioner's current
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incarceration is for the following crimes:2"ddegree murder, two cbunts (each 25 years to
life); 1" degree attempted robbery, two counts (each 5 to 15 years); promoting prison
contraband, two counts (each 2 % to 5 years). All are being served concurrently to each
other, Among the many arguments set forth in the petition; petitioner points out that this is

his fourth appearance before the Parole Board. He indicates that in I989 he earned his GED
degree while at Green Haven Correctional Facility. He then entered Dutchess Community

CoIlege. However before he could complete his studies, he was transferred to Auburn
Correctional Facility. He then enrolled in Cayuga Community ColIege where, in 1993, he

earnedanhsociates Degree in liberal arts. After being transferred to Sing Sing Correctional
Facility he completed two more years of education and earned a Bachelors Degree in
behavioral science from Mercy College. In ZOO7 he completed ASAT and ART,phases one,
two and three. In 2008-2009 he worked in the prison law jibrary at FrankIin Correctional

Facility. He taught HIV classes and worked in the prison tailor shop, and has held various

jobs and completedvarious programs. He indicates that he has written six novels since 2003

and is working on an autobiography and a book on bullying. He submitted what he refers to
as a "Ietter of remorse'', which chroniclesportions of his life, The petitioner criticizes the

Parole Board for failureto consider his many accomplishments. In his view the Parole Board

faiied to engage in a risk and needs assessment, as required under 20 11 amendments to the
Executive Law

L 20 11ch 62, Part CySubpart A, fi 3 8 4 , amending Executive Law 259-

c 141). He indicates that the Parole Board did not have his sentencing minutes before it, but
that in any event the sentencing judge did not recommend that he be held beyond the

minimum term of his sentence. In his view, the Board failed to consider the appropriate
2
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factors under Executive Law 259-i. Rather, it focused almost entirely on the serious nature

of his crimes.
Counsel for the respondent argues that the ParoIe Board satisfied all of the

requirementsof Executive Law 2594 (2) IC>. He points out that during the parole interview,
the Parole Board discussedpetitioner’s pre-sentence investigation report,the instant offenses,

his criminal history, his programming, disciplinary record and plans upon release. He
indicates that the inmate status report reviewed the foregoing factors, as wel1. Counsel
maintains that the Parole Board engaged in the equivalent of a risk arid needs analysis as
required under Executive Law 259-c (4) by evaluating such factors as petitioner’s

institutional record, program goals, accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational

education training9work assignments, therapy, interpersonal relationships with staff and
inmates, and releaseplans. As part ofthe foregoing argument, it is asserted that the inmate
status report, in effect, incorporates risk and needs principles in its analysis of the

appropriateness of petitioner’s release.

The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole

are set forth as follows:
“After a careful review of your record, your personal interview,
and due deliberation, it is the determination afthis panel that, if
released at this the, there is a reasonable probability that you
would not live at Iiberty without violating the law, your release
at this time is incompatible with the welfare and safety of the
community, and will so deprecate the seriousness of this crime
as to undermine respect for law. This decision is based upon the
following factors: You stand convicted of the following serious
offenses of murder in the second degree, two counts, attempted
robbery in the first degree, two counts, and promoting phon
contraband. In the first instance, you caused the death of a
victim by stabbing her numerous times in the neck, chest,
3
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abdomen, and back. This was a pre-arranged meeting where
you intended to steal money and cocaine. You continue to get
tickets in prison, the latest being a Tier 111 for a sex offense.
Consideration has been given to you program completion,
however, your release at this time is denied.”

Pade Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to

statutory

requirements, not reviewable (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept.,
20041; Matter of ColIado v New York State Division of Parole, 287 AD2d 921 [3d Dept.,

20011). Furthermore, only a “showingof irrationality bordering on impropriety”on the part

ofthe Parole Board has been found to necessitatejudicial intervention

Matter of Silmm

v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of

Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [19801; see also Matter of Graziano v Evans, 90 AD3d 1367,1369
[3d Dept., 20111). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the
discretionary determination made by the ParoIe Board (see Matter of Perez v. New York
State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 L3rd Dept., ZOOZ]).

As relevant here, the 20 1 1amendments to the Executive Law &L 20 1 1 ch 62, Part
C, Subpart A, 8 3 8-b, et seq.) made two changes with respect to how parole determinations

are made. First, Executive Law Q 259-c was revised to eliminate mention of Division of

Parole guidelines

9 NYCFtR 800 1.3 [a]), in favor of requiring the Division of Parole to

rely upon criteria that would place greater emphasis on assessing the degree to which inmates
have been rehabilitated, and the probability that they would be able to remain crime-free if
reIeased &.g Executive Law 259-c [4]).

Said section now recites: “[tlhe state board of

parole shall [] (4) establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions as
required by law. Such written procedures shalt incorporate risk and needs principles to
4
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measure the rehabilitation of persons a p p e g before the board, the likelihood of success

of such persons upon release, and assist members ofthe state board of parole in determining
which inmates may be released to parole supervision” (Executive Law 25 9-c [4 3, enacted in
L 201 1 ch 62, Part C , Subpart A, 0 38-b). This amendment was made effective six months
after its adoption on March 3 1,20 I 1, that is, on October I, 20 11 (see L 2011, ch 62, Part C,

Subpart A,

8

49-[fl).

In the second change, Executive 259-i (2) (c) was amended to

incorporate into one section the eight factors which the Parole Board was to consider in
making release determinations (see L 2011 ch 62, Part C, Subpart A,

5

28-f-1). This

amendment was effective immediately upon its adoption on March 3 1,201 1 (see L 201 1,

ck 62, Part C,Subpart A, 5 49). Notably however, it did not result in a substantive change
in the criteria which the Parole Board &odd consider in rendering its decision.
Andrea W.Evans, the Commissioner of DOCCS, implemented the provisions of

Executive Law 9 259-c (4) through issuance of a DOCCS Memorandum dated October 5 ,

201 1. She indicated hthe Memorandum that members of the Parole Board were working
With DOCCS staffto develop a transition accountability plan, or “TAP”. It is indicated that

TAP incorporates risk and needs principles, and will provide a meaningful measurement of

an inmate’s rehabilitation. According to Comissioner Evans, the TAP instrument would
replace the inmate status report. In the same Memorandum, it is indicated that the Parole
Board had been trained in usage of the Compas Risk and Ne&

Assessment tool, so that

members of the Board could understand the interplay between the Compas instrument and
the TAP instrument.

Of note in this instance, the Third Department Appellate Division recently had

5
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opportunity to rule on a case having dose similarities to the case at bar. In Matter of Garfield

v Evans

AD3d

-9

20 I3 NY Slip Op 5029, [July 3 , 2013]), the inmate’s parole

interview occurred in October 20 11, just after the effective date of Executive Law 8 259-c
(4). As here, the inmate alleged that the Parole Board failedto utilize the COMPAS Risk and

Needs Assessment instrument‘ The Appellate Division stated:
~

“Significantly, Executive Law 5 25% (4) requires that the
Board ‘establish written procedures fur its use in making parole
, decisions as required by law,’ and the Board acknowledges that
the statute requires it to incorporate risk mil needs principles
into its decision-making process. According to the record, the
Board was trained in the use of the COMPAS instrument prior
to petitioner‘s hearing. Moreover, the Board acknowledges that
it has used the CUMPAS instrument since February 2012 and
will use it for petitioner’s next appearance. Under these
circumstances, we find nojustification for the Board’s failure to
use the COMPAS instrument at petitioner‘s October 2011
hearing. Accordingly, we agree with petitioner that he is
entitled to a new hearing.[]”@.).

The Garfield case is directly applicable to the situation at bar, In this instance, there

is no evidence in the record h a t the Parole Board utilized either the Compas instrument or
the TAP instrument. Nor did the Parole Board make mention of a risk and needs analysis,

either d-uringthe parole intewiew, or within the parole deterinination. Thus, in this respect,

there is nothing to distinguish the F a d e Board’s review here fiom the process generally
employed by the Parole Board prior to the 2011 amendment of Executive Law 5 259-c (4).
The Court concludes that the petition must be granted, the October 11,201I determination
annulled, and the petitioner granted a new parole interview.
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the

‘Referredto in the petition as the “ Compass factors”.
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petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order,

is sealing all records submitted for in camera review.
Accordingly, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is granted; and it is

ORDERED, that the October I 1,20 1 1 determinationof the Parole Board is annulled
and the matter remitted to the Board of Parole for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this Court's decision.

This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original
decision/order/judgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing.

The signing of this

decisiodordewljudgment and delivery of this decisiodorderljudgment does not constitute
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the

provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry.

applicable

I

Supreme Court Justice

Papers Considered:
1.

2.

Order To Show Cake dated December 21,2012, Petition, Supporting
Papers and Exhibits
Respondent's Answer dated March 1,20 13, Supporting Papers and Exhibits
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